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The demonstration proposal moves from the capabilities
of a wireless biometric badge [4], which integrates a local-
ization and tracking service along with an automatic personal
identification mechanism, to show how a full system archi-
tecture is devised to enable the control of physical accesses
to restricted areas. The system leverages on the availabil-
ity of a novel IEEE 802.15.4/Zigbee Cluster Tree network
model, on enhanced security levels and on the respect of all
the users’ privacy issues.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Net-




WSN, Biometric, Personal Identification
1 Introduction
The relevant innovations in the ICT domain enable new
services for a growing number of people with the intent of
simplifying the tasks of every day’s life (e.g., cash retrieval,
remote-banking, etc.). The key aspect to fully enable such
services and make them widely accepted is the possibility
to reliably count on biometric identification mechanisms [1].
Although some of them are already available, they are still
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widely exposed to the risk of malicious operations. Hence,
the best way to support the evolution of automatic services
is to develop a (automatic) system, able to check the users’
identity. The success of such systems depends on their easy
integration in different scenarios, especially when an existing
infrastructure is already in-place, and on a design focused
on the respect of all the relevant privacy issues, but flexible
enough to provide the users with the feeling (i.e., reliability,
safety and usability) needed to make the system accepted.
In such a context, WESTAquila [6] recently presented [4]
an automatic personal identification system, which exploits
the recent advances in the biometric and heterogeneous wire-
less networks fields to provide a true authentication platform
able to support several services, including physical access
(e.g., to restricted areas or vehicles) as well as logical access
(e.g., to personal services, like e-banking) management. The
main component of the system is a novel biometric badge,
i.e., a smart-card equipped with a fingerprint reader and a
wireless transceiver, with which the identification of both
the card itself and its owner is enabled. When required, the
card’s owner is identified through an on-system biometric
matching and only the result of such a matching is sent (ap-
propriately ciphered) through the wireless interface towards
the rest of the system. Therefore, personal biometric data is
always under the full control of its owner, leading to high
levels of security and privacy protection.
2 System Architecture
The proposed architecture is sketched in Fig. 1 and is
composed by a set of elements (detailed in the following)
enabling the high level of flexibility and reliability needed to
make it a reference in the field of personal automatic iden-
tification systems, where the emphasis is on aspects like ro-
bustness, ease-of-use and privacy.
Biometric Badge (BB). As a “system-on-badge” [4], the
embedded biometric badge performs four main tasks: (i) to
enable the localization of its owner using distributed posi-
tioning techniques, (ii) to scan and verify fingerprints [5],
Figure 1. Logical System Architecture
(iii) to check if an user is the badge’s owner based on fin-
gerprint matching, and (iv) to send related outcomes to the
rest of the system, without the need of transmitting owners’
biometric data over the wireless medium.
Distributed Unit (DU). Every DU is logically constituted
by a “Gateway” (GW), one or more “Readers” (RDs) and
one or more “Actuators” (ATs) communicate over wireless
or wired media. The whole system can rely on several DUs,
networked over secure channels with a Central Processing
Station (CPS).
Gateway (GW). It is the central element of each DU. Its
main function is to provide an interface between the BBs and
the CPS: (i) it collects data from BBs through its associated
RDs and sends them to CPS, and (ii) receives instructions
from CPS to control ATs to grant or deny the access to BBs.
Reader (RD). It is the interface between the DU and the
BBs. When the communication between the RDs and the
GW is wireless and multi-hop, the RDs constitute a network
of readers (NRD), organized according to the ZigBee Cluster
Tree model [2, 3].
Actuator (AT). It is the device in direct contact with the
Controlled System and allows the GW to grant the access to
the authenticated users.
Central Processing System (CPS). It contains data for
the whole system configuration: it stores and handles BBs’
grants with respect to the different UDs, as well as the
services that BB’s owners can access, once authenticated.
CPS is the interface with the “System Administrator” (SA),
which is in charge of (i) delivering the BBs to people, and
(ii) adding/updating all system configuration data (enroll-
ment), i.e., the association between the BBs and the services
allowed to its owner.
3 Demo: Access to a Critical Area
Let us assume that a SA has released a number of BBs
to authorized people. This means that each BB stores the
fingerprint of its owner and the central system is aware of
the access rights of each BB.
The access to a critical area towards a controlled gate is
performed by means of the following steps (Fig. 2). (i) The
BB is in stand-by mode, i.e., it is waiting for a beacon sent by
one of the RDs forming a ZigBee Cluster Tree topology [2,
3]. (ii) When the BB enters the ZigBee area, it is able to
ear the beacons sent by the RDs and to communicate with
the control unit on the gate, in order to inform it about its
Figure 2. Case Study – Physical access to a critical area
arrival. In this context, the badge implements a positioning
solution [4] modified to use the information provided within
the beacon messages sent by the RDs. The DU is able to
communicate with the CPS in order to make in advance any
control related to the badge identification (i.e., to check if it is
allowed to access the gate it is approaching). (iii) Assuming
that the BB is allowed to pass the gate, the DU waits for the
proximity of the BB. (iv) When the BB is close to the gate,
DU asks the BB to start the personal identification, i.e., the
BB asks the owner to scan his/her fingerprint, it compares
that scan with the stored one, and (only) the result of such
a verification is sent (ciphered) back to the DU, where the
GW is the only device able to decode that information. (v) If
the identification is successful, DU opens the gate, otherwise
proper actions defined by the SA at system setup are taken.
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